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I. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The following is a list of parties to the proceeding: 
1. Rolando Avila, plaintiff; 
2. Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance, 
defendant; 
3. Holy Cross Hospital Family Health and Emergency 
Center, defendant; 
4. Holy Cross Hospital, defendant; 
5. Robert Winn, M.D., defendant; and 
6. David J. Howe, M.D., defendant. 
ii 
II. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
ARGUMENT 3 
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH MEDICAL CARE 
MALPRACTICE ACT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED 3 
B. THE ISSUES OF WAIVER, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WERE 
RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL 8 
I. DEFENDANT, HOWE, WAIVED THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 8 
II. THE DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 
IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF RES 
JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 9 
CONCLUSION 10 
iii 
III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Otero v. Zouhar, 697 P.2d 493 (N.M.App. 1984) 
iv 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case, course of proceedings and 
disposition of the Trial Court has been adequately briefed in 
appellant's Opening Brief, however, in response to the Briefs of 
the respondents, appellant needs to clearly the following facts 
which are undisputed: 
1. Appellant suffered a skiing injury on February 1, 
1984 while skiing in Park City, Utah and received medical care 
from the defendants. 
2. A Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action 
as required by Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4 was timely filed on 
January 31, 1986, pursuant to §78-14-8 U.C.A. The time to file a 
Complaint was extended for 120 days from February 1, 1986 to May 
31, 1986. 
3. On March 4, 1986, appellant filed a Request for 
Panel Review as required by §78-14-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended). 
4. The Department of Business Regulations did not 
schedule a pre-litigation review hearing in a timely manner in 
order to comply with the 120 day extension period of the Statute 
of Limitations provided in §17-14-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
5. Appellant filed his Complaint on May 23, 1986 to 
comply with the 120 day extension period provided by §78-14-8 
U.C.A. 
6. Defendant, David Howe, M.D., filed an Answer to 
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Plaintiff's Complaint on June 20, 1986. The Answer did not 
contain any affirmative defenses relating to the Statute of 
Limitations or the failure of plaintiff to comply with any 
conditioned precedent under the Utah Malpractice Act, 
7. All defendants entered an appearance by written 
Stipulation dated June 30, 1986, after the suit had been 
initiated and answer filed, which extended the time for the pre-
litigation review hearing by the Department of Business 
Regulations for successive 30-day periods. 
8. A pre-litigation review hearing was not attempted 
until December 2, 1986. 
9. Defendants waited until November, 1987 to file a 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply 
with Utah's Medical Malpractice Act. Judge Pat Brian, ruling on 
the Motion, did not grant defendants' Motion to Dismiss and did 
not dismiss the Complaint but rather tolled the proceedings 
pending a full pre-litigation panel review, the proceedings were 
tolled to comply with the intent of the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act. 
10. A second pre-litigation review panel was held on 
July 6, 1988 and an opinion was rendered on July 12, 1988. On or 
about August 24, 1988, plaintiff's counsel, George M. Haley, 
withdrew from the case leaving plaintiff without counsel. 
11. Defendants again filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint in September, 1988, for failure to 
prosecute and failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice 
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Act Statute of Limitations requirement. A hearing was held on 
October 17, 1988, this time before Judge Michael Murphy of the 
Third District Court. Judge Michael Murphy granted defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss this time because a new Complaint had not been 
filed in December although the pervious Complaint was never 
dismissed and Judge Pat Brian tolled the proceedings on the prior 
Complaint. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH MEDICAL CARE MALPRACTICE 
ACT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff complied with the Utah 
Medical Malpractice Act by filing a Notice of Intent to Commence 
an Action within two years of his alleged injury and by 
requesting a pre-litigation panel review hearing from the 
Department of Business Regulations within 60 days of filing his 
Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action. It is also 
undisputed that the Department of Business Regulations was having 
difficulties scheduling a pre-litigation review panel within a 
the sixty day time period. (Court Trans. October 11, 1988, p. 
13). The delay in the review hearing was not the fault of the 
appellant (Trans, p. 6) and was not anticipated by the 
legislature in enacting the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. 
(Trans, p. 13). 
Section 78-14-8 Utah Code Annotated specifically 
provides that: 
If the notice is served less than 90 days 
prior to the expiration of the applicable 
time period the time for commencing the 
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malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from 
the date of service of notice. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Intent was filed on January 31, 
1986. Therefore, by filing his Complaint on May 23, 1986, 
appellant was acting in accordance with the Statute of 
Limitations provided in Utah's Malpractice Act , §78-14-8. 
Although §78-14-12(3) provides that the filing of a request for 
pre-litigation panel review tolls the applicable Statute of 
Limitations until 60 days following the issuance of an opinion by 
the pre-litigation panel; this was insufficient to protect the 
appellant as the Department of Business Regulations continued to 
delay in holding a pre-litigation hearing and the running of the 
time limitation for the Department of Business Regulations to 
hold a hearing was to expire. (Trans, p. 13). Rather than have 
the Department's jurisdiction expire, the parties stipulated to a 
successive 30 day continuance in order to allow the Department 
of Business Regulations to have continued jurisdiction until a 
pre-litigation hearing could be held. (Court Trans. October 11, 
1988, pp. 11-12). However, this Stipulation was not entered into 
until June 30, 1986. A month after the Complaint had been filed 
and after the 120 day limitation period in §78-14-8 would have 
expired. Judge Brian realizing the dilemma of the appellant and 
the delay on the part of the Department of Business Regulations 
appropriately tolled the proceedings pending a complete pre-
litigation review hearing to comply with the legislative intent 
behind Utahfs Medical Malpractice Act. Judge Brian did not 
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simply dismiss appel Knil '" *. i » mi|i I .. 11.1 thereby giving the appellant 
an opportunity to refile within ^ day<* af ten: the i ssuance of an 
opinion as respondents argue. it- must be remembered that after a 
complete revd ew was f ii ia.1 1 y h e i i i i • ., > -
 Y < >f 1988, appellant' s 
Complaint remained and appellant was without counsel. 
Defendants argue that plaintiff should have filed a 
Compi aint wi f h i n hi I <iay;*:; f n I luwi . i< j f he rendering of the pi: e-
litigation panel opinion ii \ December. (Cour t Trans. October 2 1, 
1988, p. 16) Bu t certain facts were not known to the plaintiff 
in Ma^ of 1 986 when p] a. 1 i ltd ff f i led ai id plaintiff was afraid the 
limitation period provided in §78-14- 8 would expire. For 
example, appellant's Complaint was filed before the Stipulation 
w a s i >.i*.i- urisdiction to conduct 
a hearing in December ;t i -' • 4 f 1986, it was doubtful 
that a hearing would nn nnld. Trans. ; 13). Furthermore, 
fil:i ng the Comp] ai i it a Eter the December 1 iearj ng woi il d not have 
complied with the Utah Malpractice Act anyway as the December 
hearing was found to be insufficient to comply with the 
Malpi ac t i et • A(i In, .liiili{i> BJ'IHII. Respondents would have still 
argued that plaintiff failed to comply with the Malpractice Act 
by filing his Complaint before an adequate pre-litigation review 
hear i ng. 
Judge Murphy granted defendant,;"" Motion bdSTu - . *-
upon the respondents 1 interpretation of the stipulation entered 
into, riml 1 hf represented fact that ij^ the plaintiff had filed a 
new Complaint after the December hearing, defer iciai its woul d i 10 i : 
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have objected. (Court Trans. October 17, 1988 pp. 14-16). This 
type of hind-sight analysis as to what respondents would have 
done is not the proper standard. Particularly on a Motion to 
Dismiss where the evidence should be considered in light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. This is even more prejudicial 
to the appellant in this case because the lawsuit is outside the 
Statute of Limitations due to the delays of the Department of 
Business Regulations. Judge Murphy did not even consider the 
evidence in this light nor even inquire as to the plaintiff's 
understanding of the Stipulation or Judge Brian's ruling. 
Furthermore, as officers of the court, the respondent's attorneys 
have a ethical obligation to speak truthfully to the court and 
not make false statements. (Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional 
Conduct). 
The plaintiff's case is entirely different than those 
cited by the respondents in their Answers. In plaintiff's case, 
a pre-litigation hearing was held, a Notice of Intent to Commence 
Malpractice Action was timely filed as well as a request for a 
pre-litigation hearing. In the cases cited by the respondents, 
there was no notice of intent filed nor a pre-litigation panel 
review. In Otero v. Zouhar, 697 P.2d 493 (N.M.App. 1984), the 
plaintiff's Complaint was filed before any application was made 
to the medical review commission to review the malpractice claims 
as required by New Mexico Statute §41-5-15(a). This is clearly 
different from the plaintiff's case. Plaintiff gave timely 
notice of his claim and timely filed a request for hearing before 
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filing . . . • ,- ^-a^lrq was on the part 
of the Department of Business Regulations and not the plaintiff. 
Due to 1 rx=> delays by • N:- department of Business Regulations, 
plaint J * : 'i • : . "-mi H *:•' the end of May, ;9Rf; to 
comply with §78-14-8 of the Utah Malpractice Act- Had ,>..» . • i_ff 
waited to file his Complaint the Stipulation entered into r/ the 
par t:i es may i: : .e ? e i : 1: is • - •• . execi ited and. plaintiff would have 
been left out of court Plaintiff, in an attempt to c- up, -h 
both tolling statutes <r the Utah Malpractice Act, had to • . . -
1: i is Comp] aii it bef o i: € "";J| I i t i gation review hearing. :*•-dc^  
Pat Brian, realizing this, appropriately tolled the pm.-cen- :. • 
until a complete pre-litigation review hearing could be held and 
ti * . !. m i e n t of the Utah Malpractice 
Act. 
B. THE ISSUES OF WAIVER, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, RES 
JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WERE RAISED AT THE 
TRIAL COURT LEVEL. 
Although the plaintifi at the court hearing r-r. ctober 
11, 1988 was without counsel and appearing pro se, the issues of 
waiver Statute <^ 'Limit <i* u)M(,( > ^ s mdic.ata and collateral 
estoppel were raised to Judge Murphy and are cited in the record. 
For example, the issue as to whether there was a waiver on the 
part of the responden t:s i s discussed on pages 7, 13, 14, and 15, 
the issue of res judicata and collateral estoppel on pages 4, 7, 
11, 12, and 16, and issues as to the Statute of Limitations on 
pages. 11, 1 'A, 1 i, ; 16. 
I. DEFENDANT, HOWE, WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DEFENSE, 
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This argument is adequately briefed in appellant's 
Opening Brief. The Statute of Limitations is an affirmative 
defense and can be waived. Statutory remedies and procedural 
defects can also be waived. Defendant, Howe, answered the 
Complaint, waiving the affirmative defense of the Statute of 
Limitations and went even further by signing a Stipulation 
tolling the Statute of Limitations. Furthermore, at trial the 
defendants admitted that although the Complaint had been already 
filed, they wanted to proceed with the pre-litigation review 
hearing to determine the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 
(Trans, pp. 7-8). 
II. THE DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS IS BARRED BY 
THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
This argument is also adequately briefed in appellant's 
Opening Brief. These issues were also raised at the trial court 
level and are properly before this Court. In addition to 
appellant's Opening Brief, appellant wishes to add that it is 
highly prejudicial and unfair for the Court to have two such 
inconsistent rulings on the same Motion. On defendants' first 
Motion to Dismiss, Judge Pat Brian refused to dismiss plaintiff's 
Complaint but rather tolled the proceedings to comply with the 
Utah Medical Malpractice Act. Plaintiff, relying on Judge 
Brian's ruling, did not file a new Complaint. Then after the law 
suit is outside of the Statute of Limitations period, due to the 
delays of the Department of Business Regulations, Judge Michael 
Murphy dismissed plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with 
the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. The Utah Medical Malpractice 
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A c t v i.=t s e n a c. • f e d t; o p x o t e c t a i "i i i i i 't s u i" e I. h e i "•«;,) n t i. ri u e d a v a 1 1 a b i 1 i t y 
of health care services to the public by providing ai 1 efficient 
evaluation of malpractice claims before litigation. The purpose 
• : f 1: I: i s ac t wa s comp .1 i e d wi t:I :i i  i : t: 1 Ii s c a s e i ! p r e 11 1 t i g a t i on 
panel review hearing was held and plaintiff's Complaint was 
tolled until after such hearing could be held. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant complied with the requirements of the 
Utah Medical Malpractice Act by filing his Complaint within 120 
days; from the No t::I ce :: I: I. * c ommence ai l ac t:. - • .it-1 ay 
in scheduling - - pre-litigation review hearing was not the fault 
of the appellant .• .* •:.<=• Department of Business Regulations. If 
t h e a p p e 1 ] a • C o in p I a :i i i t !:  1 i e "1 2 0 ::! a ^ • 
period would have expired before a pre-litigation hearing could 
be held and before the tolling provision of §78-14-12(2) could be 
i i lvoked. 
Judge Brian properly dealt with this matter by tolling 
the proceedings until after a complete pre-litigation review 
hear. i ng cou] d be 1 lei d a id by i 10 t dii smi ssi i ig p] ai i it if f f s 
Complaint. 
Respondents, their acts and dealings with the 
plaintiff in en ter ing .. • >--.< - : --^  -1: id s t ipul a ti ng to a 
continuance o f the Department ; Business Regulations 1 
jurisdiction to hold a pre-litigation review hearing after the 
filing of the Complai i i t wai vot\ ruiy flnim -is to pJaint i t f ' ,s 
failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, 
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In order to prevent the failure of justice, plaintiff, hereby 
requests this Court to provide the adequate remedy as justice 
requires. 
DATED this Ps / day of August, 1989. 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
BY: ^ / ^ 4 r {/) £&4<-~ 
Efa3ge W. / C a l l 
Appe l lan t 
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